Love him, or hate him, President Donald J. Trump brings out the worst of everyone around him, just like the crazy uncle after a family wide 8 hour monopoly bender on Thanskgiving night. While Trump might not be playing 4d Chess, as some claim, his penchant for Monopoly might have gifted him a “get out of jail free” card that few people are discussing.
And that possibility might be the bait set on the hook that Alvin Bragg and his fellow prosecutors in New York find themselves on as they drop a sealed indictment with almost 30 counts. Given what little we know now, it is possible (if not likely) that Trump waddles out of New York unscathed, not only eligible to run for the Presidency in 2024, but with his supporters even more virulent.
Admittedly, it is a very serious situation that former President Donald J. Trump faces in 2023. Historically speaking, he stands alone in history as being the only current or former President of the United States to be indicted with a crime (fun fact. Grant was pulled over and arrested for speeding, but that’s another story). On the other hand those of us who do defense work know that indictments can often be meaningless theater. It was the great American author Thomas Wolfe who wrote in The Bonfire of the Vanities (quoting New York State Chief Judge Sol Wachtler) that “a grand jury would indict a ham sandwich, if that’s what you wanted.”
And that is more true than we would like it to be.
So, did the District Attorney outsmart himself, or bend to political pressure and go on a fool’s errand? Or, conversely, is this time when Trump experiences the “when keeping it real, goes wrong” moment? Time will tell, but it all might be moot.
America has a long standing tradition with the separate criminal codes of the States that allows for first time offenders to apply for a program that postpones punishment for a probationary period and if the agreed to conditions are met by the Defendant, they are allowed to have their arrest and criminal convictions wiped off their record completely.
Let that sink in….
Even with a felony conviction, Trump could walk unscathed. This, is called a diversion and is something that anyone charged with a crime should discuss with their counsel. It can, truly, be a get out of jail free card.
So let’s get to the good part as it relates to potential charges that might be included in Trump’s sealed indictment:
The juicy charges that everyone wants are related to hush money payments made to an adult actress and a connection to campaign financial laws. That begs the question, are campaign financial crimes eligible for a Pre-Trial or Judicial Diversion in the State of New York?
(TRIGGER WARNING – long winded legal gobblydook follows that is more inside-baseball that most people want to read)
It appears that campaign financial crimes may be eligible for pre-trial or judicial diversion in New York.
Several cases discuss the eligibility requirements for judicial diversion, which include being charged with a class B, C, D, or E felony offense, or any other “specified offense” as defined in CPL 410.91(4). While none of the cases specifically mention campaign financial crimes, they do suggest that a wide range of offenses may qualify for diversion. Additionally, the DOJ’s revised policies on charges, pleas, and sentencings, as discussed in the Client Alert, encourage districts to develop pretrial diversion policies that may encompass a wider range of offenses. However, it is important to note that the decision to grant diversion is ultimately within the court’s discretion, and the court will consider a number of factors in making that decision.
Cases
People v. DeYoung, 95 A.D.3d 71 (N.Y. App. Div. 2012)
People v. DeYoung discusses the factors a court must consider when deciding whether to grant a defendant’s application for judicial diversion in New York, and ultimately reverses the lower court’s denial of diversion. This case is relevant to President Donald Trump because it provides guidance on the circumstances in which judicial diversion may be available in New York, even for serious crimes.
Turning to the merits, as noted above, upon the completion of a hearing on the issue of whether a defendant should be offered judicial diversion, the court “shall consider and make findings of fact with respect to whether: (i) the defendant is an eligible defendant as defined in subdivision one of section 216.00 of this article; (ii) the defendant has a history of alcohol or substance abuse or dependence; (iii) such alcohol or substance abuse or dependence is a contributing factor to the defendant’s criminal behavior; (iv) the defendant’s participation in judicial diversion could effectively address such abuse or dependence; and (v) institutional confinement of the defendant is or may not be necessary for the protection of the public” (CPL 216.05[3] [b] ). There is no dispute that the defendant is an eligible defendant as defined in CPL 216.00.
Since all of the factors set forth in CPL 216.05(3)(b) militate in favor of judicial diversion, the County Court should have granted the defendant’s application for judicial diversion pursuant to CPL article 216. Accordingly, the judgment is reversed, on the facts and in the exercise of discretion, the defendant’s application to participate in judicial diversion pursuant to CPL article 216 is granted, and the matter is remitted to the County Court, Orange County, for further proceedings in accordance with CPL article 216.
Doorley v. DeMarco, 106 A.D.3d 27 (N.Y. App. Div. 2013)
This case discusses the eligibility requirements for judicial diversion in New York, including the types of offenses that qualify. Although it does not specifically mention campaign financial crimes, it provides guidance on how to interpret the relevant statutes.
We now conclude that the petition/complaint should be granted in part. As part of the Drug Law Reform Act of 2009, the New York State Legislature enactedCPL article 216, which created a judicial diversion program allowing selected felony offenders, whose substance abuse or dependence was a contributing factor to their criminal conduct, to undergo alcohol and substance abuse treatment rather than be sentenced to a term of imprisonment. After the arraignment of an “eligible defendant,” an authorized court determines whether to allow the defendant to participate in judicial diversion (CPL 216.05[1]; seeCPL 216.05[4]; People v. DeYoung, 95 A.D.3d 71, 73–74, 940 N.Y.S.2d 306).
For example, CPL 216.05(4) provides that when an authorized court determines “that an eligible defendant should be offered alcohol or substance abuse treatment …, an eligible defendant may be allowed to participate in the judicial diversion program offered by this article” (emphasis added).
CPL 216.00(1) provides as follows: “ ‘Eligible defendant’ means any person who stands charged in an indictment or a superior court information with a class B, C, D or E felony offense defined in article two hundred twenty or two hundred twenty-one of the penal law or any other specified offense as defined in subdivision four of section 410.91 of this chapter, provided, however, a defendant is not an ‘eligible defendant’ if he or she: “(a) within the preceding ten years, excluding any time during which the offender was incarcerated for any reason between the time of commission of the previous felony and the time of commission of the present felony, has previously been convicted of: (i) a violent felony offense as defined in section 70.02 of the penal law or (ii) any other offense for which a merit time allowance is not available pursuant to subparagraph (ii) of paragraph (d) of subdivision one of section eight hundred three of the correction law, or (iii) a class A felony offense defined in article two hundred twenty of the penal law; or “(b) has previously been adjudicated a second violent felony offender pursuant to section 70.04 of the penal law or a persistent violent felony offender pursuant to section 70.08 of the penal law.
People v. Alston, 161 A.D.3d 472 (N.Y. App. Div. 2018)
People v. Alston discusses the requirements for judicial diversion in New York, and specifically addresses the court’s discretion to grant or deny a request for diversion. The case also emphasizes that substance abuse need only be a “contributing factor” to criminal behavior in order for diversion to be appropriate.
The court improvidently exercised its discretion in denying defendant’s request to participate in the judicial diversion program. The court based this determination on the erroneous ground that defendant had failed to establish that his “substance abuse or dependence [wa]s a contributing factor to [his] criminal behavior” ( CPL 216.05[3][b][iii] ).
Accordingly, the court should order judicial diversion pursuant to CPL article 216, giving due recognition to the drug treatment program defendant has already completed. This result is consistent with one of the purposes of judicial diversion, which is to permit a defendant to achieve a disposition other than a felony conviction, where appropriate.
This analysis discusses the DOJ’s revised policies on charges, pleas, and sentencings, which include a directive for all districts to develop an appropriate pretrial diversion policy. While the analysis does not specifically mention campaign financial crimes, it suggests that pretrial diversion may be available for a wider range of offenses.
For example, all districts are to develop an appropriate pretrial diversion policy. The Department’s enhanced focus on pretrial diversion and other alternatives to federal prosecution corresponds with the Sentencing Commission’s recent notice that it intends to conduct a study of court-sponsored diversion and alternatives-to-incarceration programs.8 Per Garland’s memorandum, all districts and litigating divisions also are to develop and/or expand procedures designed to ensure supervision of the exercise of discretion in the context of charging and sentencing.
People v. Buswell, 88 A.D.3d 1164 (N.Y. App. Div. 2011)
While the case does not directly address campaign financial crimes, it does discuss the judicial diversion program in New York and the trial court’s discretion in offering it to eligible defendants.
Although defendant’s ineffective assistance of counsel argument implicates the voluntariness of his guilty plea and thus survives his appeal waiver ( see People v. Shurock, 83 A.D.3d 1342, 1344, 920 N.Y.S.2d 862 [2011]; People v. Fitzgerald, 56 A.D.3d 811, 812, 867 N.Y.S.2d 234 [2008] ), defendant’s argument in that regard is unavailing. His primary contention in support of his motion to withdraw his plea was that his counsel failed to advise him regarding the judicial diversion program created by CPL article 216. We note that whether an eligible defendant will be offered judicial diversion pursuant to that article is within the trial court’s discretion ( see CPL 216.05[4] ). Here, in denying defendant’s withdrawal motion, County Court stated that under the circumstances of this case it would not have exercised its discretion in defendant’s favor even if an application had been made. Inasmuch as judicial diversion would not have been available to defendant and he has produced no other “evidence of innocence, fraud or mistake in the inducement” ( People v. Waters, 80 A.D.3d 1002, 1003, 914 N.Y.S.2d 781 [2011], lvs. denied 16 N.Y.3d 858, 864, 923 N.Y.S.2d 420, 426, 947 N.E.2d 1199, 1205 [2011]; see People v. Mitchell, 73 A.D.3d 1346, 1347, 901 N.Y.S.2d 405 [2010], lv. denied 15 N.Y.3d 922, 913 N.Y.S.2d 649, 939 N.E.2d 815 [2010] ), the court did not abuse its discretion in denying defendant’s motion to withdraw his plea. Defendant’s remaining contentions have been considered and found to be without merit.
People v. Brian M., 13 N.Y.S.3d 864 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2015)
While the case does not specifically address campaign financial crimes, it does discuss the availability of Judicial Diversion for drug-related felonies in New York, which may be analogous.
A Clayton motion should be granted only in those unusual circumstances where the defendant has demonstrated that compelling reasons exist to circumvent the strict letter of the law in order to avert a miscarriage of justice. See People v. Rickert, 58 N.Y.2d 122, 126, 459 N.Y.S.2d 734, 446 N.E.2d 419 (1983) ; People v. Clayton, 41 A.D.2d 204, 207, 342 N.Y.S.2d 106 (2d Dept.1973).
Courts now have the power to offer “Judicial Diversion,” giving offenders the option of avoiding a felony conviction altogether by entering treatment. See CPL § 216.00.
People v. M. D., 2017 N.Y. Slip Op. 51096 (N.Y. App. Term 2017)
This case discusses the eligibility requirements for record sealing under CPL 160.58, which includes completion of a judicial diversion program. Although the case does not specifically mention campaign financial crimes, it provides guidance on the types of offenses and programs that may qualify.
Pursuant to CPL 160.58, a defendant who has been convicted of, among other things, a controlled substance offense under article 220 of the Penal Law, and has completed the sentence, is eligible, upon motion to the sentencing court, to have the record of such conviction or convictions sealed. The motion may be granted if the defendant “has successfully completed a judicial diversion program” authorized by CPL article 216, “or one of the programs heretofore known as drug treatment alternative to prison or another judicially sanctioned drug treatment program of similar duration, requirements and level of supervision” (CPL 160.58 [1]). The determination whether to grant the motion ” is within the discretion of the sentencing court after consideration of various factors set forth in the statute’ ” (People v Brocki, 42 Misc 3d 53, 54 [App Term, 2d Dept, 2d, 11th and 13th Jud Dists 2013], quoting Matter of K., 35 Misc 3d 742, 743 [Sup Ct, NY County 2012]).
Carty v. Hall, 92 A.D.3d 1191 (N.Y. App. Div. 2012)
While this case does not specifically address campaign financial crimes, it does discuss the criteria for an “eligible defendant” for the judicial diversion program in New York, which may be relevant to the research request.
It is undisputed that petitioner is an “eligible defendant” as statutorily defined ( see CPL 216.00[1] ), who may be allowed to participate in the judicial diversion program ( see CPL 216.05). Petitioner argues that respondent erred in failing to order that the evaluation be performed prior to denying him entry into the program. We disagree. The statute provides that “the court at the request of the eligible defendant, may order an alcohol and substance abuse evaluation” (CPL 216.05[1] [emphasis added] ). Thus, this initial determination clearly lies within the discretion of the court, as does the determination following review of such report ( see CPL 216.05[4]; People v. Buswell, 88 A.D.3d 1164, 1165, 931 N.Y.S.2d 543 [2011] ). Accordingly, the extraordinary remedies of prohibition and mandamus are not available ( see People v. Williams, 14 N.Y.3d 198, 221, 899 N.Y.S.2d 76, 925 N.E.2d 878 [2010], cert. denied ––– U.S. ––––, 131 S.Ct. 125, 178 L.Ed.2d 242 [2010]; Matter of Johnson v. Corbitt, 87 A.D.3d 1214, 1215, 929 N.Y.S.2d 783 [2011], lv. denied 18 N.Y.3d 802, 2011 WL 6350552 [2011] ), nor is petitioner entitled to seek a declaratory judgment in this pending criminal action ( see Cayuga Indian Nation of N.Y. v. Gould, 14 N.Y.3d 614, 633, 904 N.Y.S.2d 312, 930 N.E.2d 233 [2010], cert. denied ––– U.S. ––––, 131 S.Ct. 353, 178 L.Ed.2d 251 [2010] ).
People v. Doe, 61 Misc. 3d 996 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2018)
While the case does not specifically address campaign financial crimes, it does discuss the eligibility requirements for judicial diversion in New York, which may be relevant to the research request.
New York law recognizes this reality by, for example, giving defendants who are charged with felony drug sale offenses the chance (subject to certain eligibility requirements) to participate in a substance abuse treatment program and, upon successful completion of the program, the possibility of conditionally sealing not only the records related to the case that led to the diversion — which can ultimately be disposed of in several ways, including dismissal of the indictment — but three prior drug-related misdemeanor convictions as well (see CPL §§ 160.58[2], 216.00 [1 ], 216.05 [10] ). A defendant with more than one felony narcotics indictment is eligible for diversion into treatment (see People v. Jordan , 28 Misc. 3d 708, 713, 902 N.Y.S.2d 336 [Sup. Ct., Bronx County 2010, Fabrizio, J.] [“[t]he legislature did not specifically deem an individual ineligible for judicial diversion where such person has more than one indictment”] ). And a defendant who has been diverted to a treatment program once is not precluded from being diverted a second time (see CPL § 216.00[1] ). So, conceivably, a defendant could have more than one felony case dismissed and then sealed under the diversion program, in addition to the three prior misdemeanor convictions.
People v. Lee, 158 A.D.3d 982 (N.Y. App. Div. 2018)
People v. Lee discusses the process for judicial diversion in New York, including the requirement that cases be referred to the appropriate court. Although the case does not specifically address campaign financial crimes, it provides general guidance on the process for seeking judicial diversion in New York.
Following an unsuccessful motion to suppress his confession to police, County Court conducted a hearing with respect to defendant’s application requesting judicial diversion to a substance abuse treatment program pursuant to CPL 216.05.
As relevant here, it is the duty of the Chief Administrator of the Courts, when assigning matters that are eligible for judicial diversion pursuant to CPL article 216, to ensure that such cases “shall be assigned to court parts in the manner provided by the [C]hief [A]dministrator and that, to the extent practicable, such cases are presided over by judges who, by virtue of the structure, caseload and resources of the parts and the judges’ training, are in the best position to provide effective supervision over such cases, such as the drug treatment courts” ( Judiciary Law § 212[2][r] ; see People v. Cora, 135 A.D.3d 987, 988, 22 N.Y.S.3d 655 [2016] ). To that end, Rules of the Chief Administrator of the Courts (22 NYCRR) § 143.2(c) provides that, “[w]here a Superior Court orders an alcohol and substance abuse evaluation pursuant to [ CPL 216.05(1) ] to determine whether the defendant should be offered judicial diversion for alcohol and substance abuse treatment under [CPL] article 216, the case shall be referred for further proceedings to: (1) the Superior Court for drug treatment; or (2) any other part in Superior Court designated as a Drug Treatment Court part by the administrative judge for the judicial district in which the county is located or other part in Superior Court designated to adjudicate such cases by the administrative judge where the judge or justice presiding in the part … is in the best position to provide effective supervision over cases eligible for judicial diversion” (see 22 NYCRR 43.1 ; 22 NYCRR 143.1 [c] ).
Accordingly, while County Court had jurisdiction to hear the subject felony case (see CPL 10.10[2][b] ; 10.20[1][a] ), once an alcohol and substance abuse evaluation was ordered for defendant (see CPL 216.05[1] )—for the express purpose of determining whether he was eligible for judicial diversion—the case should have been referred to the designated Superior Court for drug treatment pursuant to 22 NYCRR part 143.
ORDERED that the judgment is reversed, on the law, and matter remitted to the Superior Court designated as a Drug Treatment Court in Sullivan County by the Administrative Judge for the Third Judicial District for further proceedings not inconsistent with this Court’s decision.
Section 216.05 – Judicial diversion program; court procedures, N.Y. Crim. Proc. Law § 216.05
- At any time after the arraignment of an eligible defendant, but prior to the entry of a plea of guilty or the commencement of trial, the court at the request of the eligible defendant, may order an alcohol and substance use evaluation. An eligible defendant may decline to participate in such an evaluation at any time.
When an authorized court determines, pursuant to paragraph (b) of subdivision three of this section, that an eligible defendant should be offered alcohol or substance use treatment, or when the parties and the court agree to an eligible defendant’s participation in alcohol or substance use treatment, an eligible defendant may be allowed to participate in the judicial diversion program offered by this article. Prior to the court’s issuing an order granting judicial diversion, the eligible defendant shall be required to enter a plea of guilty to the charge or charges; provided, however, that no such guilty plea shall be required when: (a) the people and the court consent to the entry of such an order without a plea of guilty; or (b) based on a finding of exceptional circumstances, the court determines that a plea of guilty shall not be required.
When participating in judicial diversion treatment pursuant to this article, any resident of this state who is covered under a private health insurance policy or contract issued for delivery in this state pursuant to article thirty-two, forty-three or forty-seven of the insurance law or article forty-four of the public health law, or who is covered by a self-funded plan which provides coverage for the diagnosis and treatment of chemical abuse and chemical dependence however defined in such policy; shall first seek reimbursement for such treatment in accordance with the provisions of such policy or contract. 8.
People v. Lora, 66 Misc. 3d 241 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2019)
Guy H. Mitchell, J. This standing decision and order addresses whether the Court has the statutory authority pursuant to Criminal Procedure Law (CPL) § 160.58 to conditionally seal criminal records of defendants who successfully complete a judicial diversion drug treatment program. It is this Court’s position that CPL § 160.58 confers on judges the authority to conditionally seal criminal records related to a qualifying, enumerated offense of a defendant who successfully completes a judicial diversion drug treatment program. A common sense reading of the statute coupled with the legislative intent which can be clearly deduced from the contextual background of the statute, provides more than ample support for this conclusion.
People v. Zerafa, 38 Misc. 3d 251 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2012)
The Judicial Diversion Program for Certain Felony Offenders (CPL Article 216) grants authority to judges to determine which nonviolent defendants, whose criminal activity is the result of substance abuse or dependence, should have the opportunity to avoid a jail sentence by agreeing to complete court monitored treatment. CPL Article 216 defines those defendants who are eligible for Judicial Diversion as ones charged with certain felony drug offenses, or those charged with specified nonviolent offenses listed in CPL § 410.91(4), so long as they do not have a disqualifying condition listed in CPL § 216.00(1). If the People consent, a non-eligible defendant will be deemed eligible.
People v. Weissman, 38 Misc. 3d 1230 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2013)
She seeks to participate in the Judicial Diversion Program under CPL Article 216 and to be allowed to participate in that Program without the prior entry of a guilty plea.
CPL § 216.00(1) provides the criteria for eligibility for participation in a judicial diversion program. A person is eligible if she is charged in an indictment with a B, C, D, or E felony drug offense or with any other offense listed in CPL § 410.91(5).
Accordingly, she is a statutorily eligible candidate for diversion. Defendant has also requested that she be permitted to enter diversion without the entry of a guilty plea.
People v. Brocki, 42 Misc. 3d 53 (N.Y. App. Term 2013)
In 2004, defendant was convicted, upon his plea of guilty, of criminal possession of a controlled substance in the seventh degree. In 2010, defendant moved, pursuant to CPL 160.58, to conditionally seal the record of his conviction. Section 160.58 of the Criminal Procedure Law provides, among other things, that defendants who have been convicted of controlled substances offenses under article 220 of the Penal Law, offenses involving marihuana under article 221 of the Penal Law, or offenses specified in CPL 410.91(5), and have completed the sentence or sentences imposed, are eligible, upon motion to the sentencing court, to have the records of such conviction or convictions sealed. The motion may be granted if the defendant “has successfully completed a judicial diversion program” authorized by CPL article 216, “or one of the programs heretofore known as drug treatment alternative to prison or another judicially sanctioned drug treatment program of similar duration, requirements and level of supervision” (CPL 160.58[1] ). The determination whether to grant the motion “is within the discretion of the sentencing court after consideration of various factors set forth in the statute” ( Matter of K., 35 Misc.3d 742, 743, 942 N.Y.S.2d 772 [Sup. Ct., N.Y. County 2012] ).
People v. Todd J., 61 Misc. 3d 42 (N.Y. App. Term 2018)
Pursuant to section 160.58 of the Criminal Procedure Law, a defendant who has been convicted of, among other things, a controlled substances offense under article 220 of the Penal Law, and has completed his sentence, is eligible, upon motion to the sentencing court, to have the record of such conviction sealed. The motion may be granted if the defendant “has successfully completed a judicial diversion program” authorized by CPL article 216, “or one of the programs heretofore known as drug treatment alternative to prison or another judicially sanctioned drug treatment program of similar duration, requirements and level of supervision” ( CPL 160.58 [1 ] ).
The County Court erred in denying the motion based solely on the ground that the treatment programs completed by defendant were not undertaken pursuant to the narrowly defined programs enunciated in CPL 160.58 (1).
In re K., 35 Misc. 3d 742 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2012)
The People oppose the motion and maintain that defendant is ineligible to have his record sealed because his voluntary enrollment in Shock does not qualify either as a judicial diversion or judicially mandated drug treatment program as prescribed by Criminal Procedure Law § 216. Nor, they argue, does Shock amount to a “drug treatment program of similar duration, requirements and level of supervision” as a judicial diversion or drug treatment program. CPL § 160.58(1).The defendant moves for an order pursuant to the Criminal Procedure Law to seal his 2002 conviction, by plea, for third degree sale of a controlled substance. The Statute provides that a defendant who has completed his sentence and has successfully completed a judicial diversion program “or another judicially sanctioned drug treatment program of similar duration, requirements and level of supervision” is eligible to have the conviction conditionally sealed. CPL, § 160.58(1). Whether sealing should be granted is within the discretion of the sentencing court after consideration of various factors set forth in the statute. CPL § 160.58(3).
People ex Rel. Perkins v. Moss, 50 Misc. 198 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1906)
N.Y.C. Campaign Fin Bd. v. Ortiz, 38 A.D.3d 75 (N.Y. App. Div. 2006)
Albanese v. N.Y.C. Campaign Fin. Bd., 2016 N.Y. Slip Op. 31564 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2016)
Courts cannot interfere with a respondent’s determination “unless there is no rational basis” or if the decision is “arbitrary and capricious.” Ward v. Mohr, 109 A.D.3d 694, 696 (4th Dep’t 2013)(involving decision of Erie County Board of Elections); see Brodsky v. New York City Campaign Finance Bd., 57 A.D.3d 449, 449 (1st Dep’t 2008). A decision is deemed rational and beyond judicial review if there is enough evidence to enable a reasonable person to render the challenged decision. Straker v. New York City Campaign Finance Bd., Index No. 21274/2012 (Sup. Ct. Kings County Oct. 16, 2013)(avail at 2013 WL 5630012, at *3). Courts similarly defer to the agency’s understanding and application of the pertinent statutes and guidelines. Id.
Section 143.1 – Establishment of Superior Courts for Drug Treatment, N.Y. Comp. Codes R. & Regs. tit. 22 § 143.1 Following consultation with and agreement of the Presiding Justice of the Judicial Department in which a county is located, the Chief Administrator of the Courts, by administrative order, may establish a Superior Court for Drug Treatment in Supreme Court or County Court in such county and assign one or more justices or judges to preside therein. Each such Superior Court for Drug Treatment shall have as its purpose the hearing and determination of: (a) criminal cases that are commenced in the court and that are identified by the court as appropriate for disposition by a drug treatment court; (b) criminal cases that are commenced in other courts of the county, and that are identified as appropriate for disposition by a drug treatment court and transferred to the court as provided in section 143.2 of this Part; and (c) criminal cases that are commenced in Superior Court where such court orders an alcohol or substance abuse evaluation pursuant to the Judicial Diversion Program of article 216 of the Criminal Procedure Law, where the administrative judge for the judicial district in which the county is located has designated the Superior Court for drug treatment to adjudicate such cases. N.Y. Comp. Codes R. & Regs.
Bottom line, love him or hate him, Trump might not see jail in New York, and that is a good thing if equal protection under the law is a thing. We all deserve a second chance, and diversions are a powerful tool that more should take advantage of. Besides, there are other storms on Trump’s horizon anyway.
The Lion's Den 